Study Guide

IsarMUN 2012

United Nations Security Council

Word from the Chairs

Dear delegates,

a warm welcome to IsarMUN 2012! We are happy to chair the UNSC at IsarMUN this year. We have both visited several MUNs before and we like to share the enthusiasm we have for these simulations. It is a very good way to somehow understand what is happening in the committees of the United Nations and international politics.

We hope you will have a great time discussing the two topics we've chosen for you. The situation in Somalia has been on the agenda of the UNSC often. Somalia has lost the rule of government and is seen as a place where international terrorists can operate from. Moreover Somalia has suffered famine and was also in international headlines when the incidents of piracy increased in the past decade. Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has also been a topic in the UNSC several times in the past. The outcome of the resolutions have been rather global and not precise. The members, especially the Big Five, seem to have controversial interests about this topic. And what's more: some tend to violate contracts of the past.

This background guide shall help you to find into both of the topics. We hope it provides some useful information for you during your preparation. We have worked hard to select useful information about the two topics you are to discuss and added some general knowledge about the UN Security Council itself. As this guide provides only general background information, own research about your country's position is essential. Please be well prepared: the UNSC is a small committee and debate can become very intense and lively. Make sure that you are very familiar with the Rules of Procedure which are simplier than the usual ones but which can on the one hand deadlock the council quite easily and on the other hand demand that members be cautiously with substantial matters. It needs only one of the permanent members to make a resolution fail.

Now, that only a few weeks of preparation are left we're looking forward to welcome you as a member of the Security Council and hope you will enjoy the days of simulation as much as we are expecting motivated students to come to ISARMUN and are happy to share the fruits of our work with you.

Should you have any questions or comments, please feel free to contact us: *unsc@isarmun.org*

Sincerely,

Mark-Arne Fuhl and Roland Löchli

The United Nations Security Council

There are 15 delegations which will be represented by you in the Security Council. The five permanent members are the People's Republic of China, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Russian Federation, France and the United States of America. The current non-permanent members are (with the year of term's end): Azerbaijan (2013), Colombia (2012), Germany (2012), Guatemala (2013), India (2012), Morocco (2013), Pakistan (2013), Portugal (2012), South Africa (2012), Togo (2013).

History of the committee

In June 1945 the United Nations Security Council was established due to Chapter V of the Charter of the United Nations as the primary and permanent authority of the UN system, charged with the maintenance of international peace and security. Its power is outstanding as it represents the only authority that may ultimately authorize a full military operation and it is the only committee which can make binding decisions for all members of the UN. In 1945 the members of the committee consisted of five victorious states of World War II: the Republic of China, France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialists Republics (ISSR) as well as six non-permanent members. In 1971 the Republic of China (Taiwan) was excluded from the UNSC and the People's Republic of China was taken in instead. Since 1966 there are ten non-permanent members in the Security Council, which are elected for a two years term by the United Nations General Assembly.

The five permanent members have privileges in this committee. Unlike the rotating members they have the right to veto a decision if they believe it is contrary to securing the international peace and security. One veto of one of the „Big Five" suffices to avert a decision of the committee or better: to make a

resolution fail. During the time of the Cold War the committee was dominated by the conflict between the USSR and the United States with the effect that veto powers were abused and the committee's output was very low. Since the end of the Cold War the challenges for the international community have changed and former enemies in the committee have been working constructively in many decisions. Several peace keeping mission were launched. Moreover the SC has responded to new threats like HIV/AIDS and terrorism. The UNSC stands before another big challenge, the reform of the committee itself. An increasing number of member states support the admission of regional powers into the committee as permanent members and therefore more equal distribution of power in the council. The regional powers which have applied for for a permanent seat in the council have been namely Germany, Brazil, Japan and India. So far a reform of the UNSC is not very likely in near future.

Special rules of the Security Council

The most outstanding special rule is the right to veto a decision and is only applied in the UNSC and thus sets it apart from other main bodies and agencies of the United Nations. Three of the special rules shall be explained in the following lines.

The right to veto a decision is the privilege of the „Big Five". The veto is automatically in force if a permanent member votes against a substantial decision. The veto power is not obliged to tell the committee whether it will make use of the veto power before voting. The veto is not applicable in procedural votes. Even if 14 members of the UNSC vote in favor of a particular decision one „no"-vote of a veto power will make a decision fail. So a veto should actually be used wisely in order not to upset other members of the committee. It would be more likely that a member abstains in

order to show that there is some certain discomfort with a decision being made.

A permanent member has moreover the privilege to declare procedural motion substantial. Directly after a specific procedural motion (e.g. to suspend the meeting) has been introduced by a delegate, a permanent may move to declare it substantial. This motion passes without a vote or a debate. When the committee then votes upon the now substantial motion, they may abstain if they are only present, a roll call vote is possible if a member declares it and the permanent members may use their veto. As with normal motions the chair will ask if there is any objection to declaring a motion substantial. If objection is expressed, there will be a vote to re-declare the now substantial motion a procedural motion. This very vote is a substantial with all outlined consequences: a permanent member may use its veto in order to prevent re-declaring it.

According to Article 27 of the UN Charter, the necessary minimum majority is always nine votes in favor, regardless of whether procedural or substantial matters are concerned. In substantial matters the votes of the five permanent members have to be affirmative additionally. In regard of procedural matters, the permanent five may vote with no, but still nine members of the SC with their votes in favor will make a decision pass. Should not all members of the SC be present still a vote of nine members in favor is needed to let a decision pass – this is very important to remember, as with missing members it will be harder for the committee to work constructively or to let a resolution pass.

Topic A

Situation in Somalia

Statement of the problem

British Somalia became independent in 1960. The Trust Territory of Somalia followed five days later and the two were joined to the Somali Republic, albeit within the boundaries drawn by Britain and Italy. Already at the end of the 60s it was clear that Somalia would become a regional hotspot in Africa. In 1969 President Shermarke was assassinated by his own bodyguards a military coup d'étàt followed in October 21st 1969. The Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) assuming power after Shermarke dissolved the parliament, suspended the consititution and renamed the country the Somali Democratic Republic. In 1976 SRC under Barre disbanded itself and established the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP), practically a one-party government based on socialism ans Islamic tenets. 1977 the Ogaden War broke out when the government intended to incorporate the predominantly Somali-inhabited Ogaden in so-called Greater Somalia. By September Somalia controlled ninety percent of the Ogaden. Then the two cold war rival states, the USSR and the USA began to play major roles in the region. The Soviet Union intervened with 20000 Cuban forces and several thousand Soviet troops so that Barry began to seek allies elsewhere which he found in the US. This alternating friendship enabled Somalia to build up strong forces in Africa. A new constitution was introduced in 1979. Barre's government stayed in power. 1980 the SRC was re-established and Barre's government collapsed. Many Somalis turned against the totalitarian regime and resistance movements and militia troops formed. In the beginning of the 90s Somalia had to experience shortages in different fields and the inflation grew fast. In 1991 Barre was defrocked by clan-based forces backed and armed by the neighbor Ethiopia. President Muhammad was selected as an interim president and the selection of Head of State was intended later on. Stakeholders which formerly were united with Muhammad refused to recognize him as president which led to a split between military groups. Violence escalated and the armed conflict devastated the Mogadishu area. The basis of this civil war can be seen in the allegiances and competition of clans for the resources and power. A great famine resulted due to the damage to agriculture and the hindrance of food distribution and led to 300,000 dead. The UNSC decided therefore to authorize a peacekeeping operation (United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) in 1992. It was later replaced by UNOSOM II with more powers. Aidid saw the UNOSOM II troops as a danger to his power and attached the peacekeeping forces which led to fighting between Somalis and the US. It was not possible to the UN operation to restore rule of government. In August 1996 Aidid was killed and civil war broke out again. Many Somalis sought refuge and until 2009 678,000 Somalis were under the responsibility of the UNHCR. Former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali referred to the killings of civilians during this enduring civil war as a „genocide". The loss of governmental authority has a lot of consequences.

The civil war in Somalia has had international impact in the past but has also produced tensions between Somalia and neighboring countries in recent times. Somalian militias kidnapped Europeans on Kenyan ground and attacked aid organizations. Kenya reacted with an invasion in October 2011 and claimed that the initiative was in accordance with the Somalian government. With fighter jets Kenyan troops went into heartland of the neighboring state to strike against al-Shabaab. On the one hand it is reported that Somali troops took part in the strikes with own troops, on the other hand the Somalian government denied any accordance with the Kenyan intervention. The al-Shabaab and/or

sympathizing groups reacted with terrorist attacks on different churches, buses in different towns in Kenya and in the capital Nairobi. The Minister of Interior George Saitoti died in a helicopter crash and was known as a decided advocate of the fight against al-Shabaab. Moreover the USA and France denied to have taken part in air bombings on the stronghold of the rebels in Kismaayo. Kenya declared to establish buffer zones next to the boarder to stop violence dripping over on Kenyan ground. Also Ethiopian troops were sent into Somalia. At first Ethiopia denied having sent troops into Beledweyne, a city near the border which is strategically an important hotspot, but then the Ethiopian government confirmed the invasion. The AU decided accordingly to replace Ethiopian troops with AU-units[1].

Piracy

Piracy is still a severe problem at the horn of Africa. The area of pirate activity is reaching across the Arabian See to India and Madagascar. The number of attacks though has been decreasing dramatically in the past two years, the pirates can only look back on a few successful attacks in the present year. At the end of 2010 35 ships and 650 hostages were in the hands of the pirates[2]. In the 2011 the International Maritime Bureau counted 231 attacks on ships and 450 hostages which is less compared to the year 2010. In May 2012 around 17 ships were in the hand of pirates[3]. Somali pirates occupy a position which is right along highly strategic global shipping lanes yet outside the reach of any national power. It is

politically and militarily easier to try to contain the Somali piracy threat than actually eliminating it, still it comes with high costs.

In his report from 11 March 2005 on the situation of human rights in Somalia Ghanim Alnajjar mentions the issue of „Large-scale illegal fishing by foreign trawlers complicated by recent drought and floods" as a risk for the economical situation with a direct outcome on most of the inhabitants in the region of Puntland living on the business of fishing[4]. The FAO stated already in 2005 that about 700 foreign-owned ships are fully engaged in illegal, unregulated, unreported fishing[5]. The development of piracy at the horn of Africa can be split in three stages, starting from a ‚crime of opportunity' by the Somali in order to defend their fishing territory, since the territorial waters of Somalia where not well guarded since the fall of Siad Barres government in 1991 to organized crime.

According to Michael Ashkenazi the second stage Somalian warlords started to invest into piracy. To gain more money the pirates started to expand their attacks on international carriers and fishing ships in order to hijack and reap

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[1] Fischer Weltalmanach 2013, p. 255 f.

[2] Fischer Weltalmanach 2012, p. 448

[3] Fischer Weltalmanach 2013, p. 430

[4] UN Economic and Social Council 2005: Advisory Services and Technical Cooperation in the Field of Human Rights. Report of the independent expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia; E/CN.4/2005/117

[5] Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (2005): The Somali Republic. General Information; internet source as on the 11/5/2012: http://www.fao.org/fi/oldsite/FCP/en/SOM/profile.htm

money through blackmailing. In the third step it was possible to notice, that the pirates started to attack by moving by speedboat from motherships. This development made them more efficient and able to attack faster and more aggressively. Especially stage two helped the pirates to get more organized. The invested money of the warlords was used to buy weapons and technical (communication) equipment[6]. The Somali pirates can be divided into three different types: Ex-fisherman, with perfect knowledge of the sea, Ex-militiamen and technical experts[7]. To summarize: The legal vacuum of Somalia and the neglected territorial waters where made use of by foreign vessels to proverbial overfish the Somalian waters without taking care of the heavily need for the Somalian econ, witch was complicated by recent drought and floods and in deep need of it. The influence of this and different other factors made it possible to develop normal fishing-men to organized pirate-clans.

The issue for the international community is not only based on security factors, such as the danger, that piracy could effect international trade between Asia and Europa vis-à-vis the Suez Channel and the Red Sea, but also it makes it difficult to transport relief supplies to the Somalian mainland. Also the now higher risk of the attack against on a large oil tanker that passes through the Gulf of Aden and the danger of a major oil spilt in the course of an attack does not only cost higher insurance rates but is a massive risk for the environment. A great concern is also the possibility, that the money raised by pirates could be used to finance the local al-Shabaab or even worse, the piracy could lead to a type of seaborn terrorism and be co-opted by international terrorist networks[8].

So which steps have been taken against piracy so far? One big milestone in the fight against piracy might be the Resolution 1816 of the United Nations Security Council. Based on this legitimacy international forces are allowed to operate on Somali territorial waters. The later adopted Resolution 1838 „Calls upon States interested in the security of maritime activities to take part actively in the fight against piracy on the high seas off the coast of Somalia, in particular by deploying naval vessels and military aircraft, in accordance with international law". Since then EU-troops, supported by the NATO and Russia, have been trying to control the issue of piracy. Two measures were proposed to counter piracy: a large naval presence in order to secure international tankers and ships – probably in addition to organizing a shipping safe lane – and the support of the Somalian government in its efforts of state, nation and army building, which would sooner or later probably lead to a strong Somali government which is able to provide a coast guard to secure the most important fishing regions for their population[9].

Different factors have contributed to the decrease in pirate hijackings in 2012. Mandates have become stronger. The European Union decided to lengthen its Atalanta-Mission to secure cargo ships until 2014 and expanded its authority to operate on land in March. In May EU-troops attacked pirate bases from the air and destroyed several ships[10]. Shipping companies have equipped their ships with more effective countermeasures, namely armed guards. The widespread deployment of armed guards began in 2011 and has a close correlation to the decrease of hijacking. It is estimated that around 70 percent of all commercial ships sailing through operative

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6 Denis Düttman 2008: http://www.epochtimes.de/680167_ursprung-und-entwicklung-der-piraterie-in-somalia.html

7 Robyn Hunter 2008: Somali pirates living the high life, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7650415.stm

8 Roger Middleton 2008: Piracy in Somalia. Threatening global trade, feeding local wars. Chatham House. Briefing paper, p. 10

9 Roger Middleton 2008: Piracy in Somalia. Threatening global trade, feeding local wars. Chatham House. Briefing paper, p. 9

10 Fischer Weltalmanach 2013, p. 430

seas of Somali pirates carried guards. There are factors at work which made the number of hijacks decrease. Several dozen foreign naval ships are deployed to secure the waters at any time. They escort ships through the Gulf of Aden mostly, but they can also go after mother ships. Still it is impossible for those to control the Arabian Sea to India and Madagascar. The coordination of these foreign naval patrols has been improved over the years. The two countermeasures, armed guards and naval patrols, have not eliminated piracy, but increased the costs of attacking and seizing a commercial ship dramatically. Still the coastal towns of Somalia, such as Hobyo and Haradheere, are still out of the control of any national or international force. The Puntland Maritime Police Force, established and financed with the help of Arab funding, made only some progress in denying pirates sanctuary on land. Somalia, to the contrary to other West African countries, is not able to control its territory and lacks the capability to control pirate such as Hobyo and Haradheere, and some officials do not appear to want a strong Puntland doing it for them. Some Western forces, including those of France, the UK and the US, have gone on land a few times to pursue pirates, generally foreign forces avoid Somalia. The only force that has significantly challenged the pirates on is the Puntland Maritime Police which was able to destroy staging bases along the beach, cutting off their supply routes and even attempting to seize hijacked vessels. But the police force has suffered from funding cuts and political opposition and appears currently no longer active against the pirates. Mogadisho fears regional governments accumulating too much strength and in the end Puntland might come out a risk to Mogadishu. UN-observers even claimed that the government in Puntland would have connections to the pirates an interrelation between the al-Shabaab and the pirates has not been found yet. In its fight against piracy

Puntland engaged the private security company. But the attempts to build up effective troops failed due to missing financial capabilities of the interim government[11].

Al-Shabaab

Al-Shabaab is an Islamic organization that controls much of southern Somalia, excluding the capital, Mogadishu. It has waged insurgency against Somalia's transitional government and its supporter of Ethiopia since the year 2006. Originally the militant wing the group that controlled Somalia prior to the country's invasion by Ethiopian forces, al-Shabaab leaders have claimed affiliation with al-Qaeda since 2007. The US added the group to its list of foreign terrorist organizations. Al-Shabaab claimed the responsibility for the bombings that killed more than seventy people in Kampala, Uganda on July 11 in 2010. The group is also seen culpable during the famine in 2011 because they prevented aid groups from helping the suffering population in time. In 2009 they even banned several international aid agencies including the UN World Food Program from southern Somalia but reversed that decision in July 2011.

The leader of Al-Shabaab is nominally Sheikh Mohamed Mukhtar Abdirahman. The group is divided into three geographical units: Bay and Bokool regions, south-central Somalia and Mogadishu , Puntland and Somaliland. A UN Monitoring report from 2008 said that the three frictions operate independently but friction between can be seen. The group itself is small, it is estimated that it contains 300 to 800 hardcore ideological members and it seems unclear how many others truly believe in its ideology. Still the group has a big footprint in Somalia which can be be explained by the missing central government since 1991.

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[11] Fischer Weltalmanach 2012, p. 448

Al-Shabaab's tactics have evolved over time. When it began its insurgency in late 2006, it used classic guerrilla tactics: suicide bombings, shootings, and targeted assassinations, to oppose and weaken the Somali government and its allies, from aid groups to the Ethiopian military and to African Union peacekeepers. Much of the violence was concentrated in Mogadishu; battles between the Ethiopian military and al-Shabaab in August 2007 caused roughly four hundred thousand people to flee the city. In 2008 al-Shabaab began to reach out to the Somali public with several town visits, which were choreographed with members addressing the locals and talks to clan leaders. They would hand out food for the poor and try to settle local disputes, all with the intention to win over the population for their interests. In the beginning of 2009 al-Shabaab controlled a great part of southern Somalia. Still they continued with suicide attacks. With the twin bombings in Kampala the attacks point so an internationalization of their terrorist activities.

The group claims allegiance with al-Qaeda. Still the link between al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda is very weak. The strongest tie between the two seems to be ideological. The two groups have released videos pledging allegiance two each other. It is unclear though whether al-Shabaab's aims go beyond Somalia.

The withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from Somalia in the beginning of 2009 removed the group's principal adversary. Still the attacks on forces of the African Union continues. The twin bombings in Uganda can be interpreted as a warning to countries sending troops into Somalia. So other countries are alarmed, among them the USA. But the future of al-Shabaab depends on different matters. It still receives financial support from Somalia's business community. The Somalian diaspora has also been supporting the group. The group's future depends on the government and how far the government shows readiness to

negotiate The US have indicated that they would increase their support for the AU-forces which might even be counterproductive due to the fact that popular support for al-Shabaab has increased in the same time. In a Special Report of the CFR Bruton advances a strategy of "constructive disengagement." Notably, this calls for the United States to signal that it will accept an Islamist authority in Somalia - including the al-Shabaab - as long as it does not impede international humanitarian activities and refrains from both regional aggression and support for international jihad. (For further information see here: (Brunson E. Bruton 2010: Somalia. A New Approach. Council on Foreign Relations. Council Special Report No. 52). In August 2011 the al-Shabaab withdraw its forces out of Mogadishu after AMISOM-troops took control over strategically important bases in the city. Still the al-Shabaab controls an estimated 200.000 km^2 around the capital. Though the government presented a roadmap to peace and also offered amnesia to al-Shabaab fighters which would give their weapons, the aggessions of the terrorists continued. On the 30th of September combats between militia of the al-Shabaab and governmental units occurred in the village Dhobley in the region Gedo near the Kenyan boarder. About a hundred people died due to a terrorist attack on a building in Mogadishu where four different ministeries are located. 80 soldiers of the AMISOM were killed in a terrorist attack in October 2011 in a military basecamp in Mogadishu. Leading political officials were killed in suicide attacks in April and May in 2012[12].

Drought

At the end of June 2011 East Africa was confronted with a severe drought. Somalia, already experiencing malnutrition – around 2.5 million people do not have enough food – was

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[12] Fischer Weltalmanach 2012, p. 428 f.

hit very hard by the drought. Being also war-torn Somalia did not have enough capabilities to encounter the drought and was therefore dependent on the international community and aid organizations. Unfortunately the international aid organizations were often hindered by the al-Shabaab. But the escalation of the effects of the drought finally brought the leadership of al-Shabaab to alter their strategy. In the beginning of July 2011 a spokesman of al-Shabaab announced that all international aid would be welcomed which would help the victims of the drought. The United Nations thus demanded security guarantees for the aid supplies[13].

Still there were reports of assault on aidworkers. At the end of October the Somali Disaster Agency reported that the situation of the famine victims would get better continually[14]. It seemed a contradiction to the appreciation of UNICEF and partners which feared a second wave of death as a representative puts at the end of October: "Across the country, tens of thousands of children have died in past months, and hundreds more die every day. Any delay or disruption in the delivery of assistance is a matter of life and death," said Sikander Khan, UNICEF's Representative in Somalia. By the

beginning of 2012 the al-Shabaab banished every aid organization again from their controlled areas. But due to a very good harvest and humanitarian aid the UN declared the famine to be ended in February 2012[15].

Past UN initiatives in Somalia

In September 1991 the United Somali Congress (USC) was the regime ruling the country after the ouster of the government of Siad Barre, which it was heavily involved in, too. Originally the USC was consisting of members of the Hawiye-Clan, but then split in two groups. The conflict between these two groups started in Mogadishu and soon involved the whole country.

In the end of 1991 the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs James O.C. Jonah was sent to Somalia in order to put an end to the ongoing conflict. Jonah was able to persuade a ceasefire between all parties, except for the party of General Aidid. This lead to even more voices asking for an intervention lead by the United Nations. The UNSC therefore adopted Resolution 733 based on Jonahs report to the Secretary-General, stating "the Security Council urged all parties to the conflict to cease hostilities, and decided that all States should immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia".[16]

UNOSOM I was adopted by the security council in resolution 751 on 24. April 1992 of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) had a humanitarian character. It had the aim to secure the supply of goods to the Somali people suffering on famine and the ongoing civil war. The resolution allowed 500

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[13] Fischer Weltalmanach 2012: p. 448

[14] Shabelle Media Network Mogadishu 2011: Somalia: The Situation of Famine Victims Getting Better – Somali Disaster Agency, http://allafrica.com/stories/201110281115.html

[15] Fischer Weltalmanach 2013, p. 430

[16] UN. Somalia - UNOSOM I: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom1backgr2.html

peacekeeping forces – the number was increased in resolution 775.

UNITAF was installed as UNOSOM I seemed to fail. Since the situation in Somalia was getting worse and the pressure of the public was rising, the UNSC decided to suspend the rather unsuccessful UNOSOM I and tried to bring stability to the country by increasing the manpower and giving the commando on the ground to the member states. After adopting resolution 794 the United States of America stated they would send a large number of troops to Somalia (Operation Restore Hope). Also other countries, such as Germany, Canada, France, Italy e.g. provided manpower to the region.

UNOSOM II [17] was Established to take over from the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) - a multinational force, organized and led by the United States, which, in December 1992, had been authorized by the Security Council to use "all necessary means" to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. The mandate of UNOSOM II was to take appropriate action, including enforcement measures, to establish throughout Somalia a secure environment for humanitarian assistance. To that end, UNOSOM II was to complete, through disarmament and reconciliation, the task begun by UNITAF for the restoration of peace, stability, law and order. Its main responsibilities included monitoring the cessation of hostilities, preventing resumption of violence, seizing unauthorized small arms,

maintaining security at ports, airports and lines of communication required for delivery of humanitarian assistance, continuing mine-clearing, and assisting in repatriation of refugees in Somalia. UNOSOM II was also entrusted with assisting the Somali people in rebuilding their economy and social and political life, re-establishing the country's institutional structure, achieving national political reconciliation, recreating a Somali State based on democratic governance and rehabilitating the country's economy and infrastructure. In February 1994, after several violent incidents and attacks on United Nations soldiers, the Security Council revised UNOSOM II's mandate to exclude the use of coercive methods. UNOSOM II was withdrawn in early March 1995.

The **UNPOS** was established by the UN secretary-General. The mandate is stated in the Security Council Resolution 1863 from the year 2009. It is located in Nairobi to make it possible for the UN secretary general to stay in touch with the authorities, Somali leaders, civic organisations and organizations in Somalia.

The **African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)** is an active, regional peacekeeping mission operated by the African Union with the approval of the United Nations. It was created by the African Union's Peace and Security Council on 19th January 2007 with an initial six month mandate. AMISOM is mandated to conduct Peace Support Operations in Somalia to stabilize the situation in the country in order to create conditions for the conduct of Humanitarian activities and an immediate take over by the United Nations. Its tasks are:

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[17] UN. Somalia - UNOSOM II: http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosom2p.htm

- Support dialogue & reconciliation in Somalia, working with all stakeholders
- Provide protection to Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) & key infrastructure to enable them carry out their functions
- Assist in the implementation of the National Security Stabilization Programme (NSSP)
- Provide technical assistance & other support to the disarmament and stabilization efforts
- Monitor the security situation in areas of operation
- Facilitate humanitarian operations including repatriation of refugees and Internaly Displaced Persons (IDPs)
- Protect AMISOM personnel, installations and equipment, including self defence

Especially in the area of Mogadishu AMISOM encounters major problems to effectively control the area. It is definitely a question of capacities. The Security Council has extended the mandate of AMISOM until October 2012. The AMISOM obtained additional troops from Djibouti and consists now of 10.000 troops. Due to Kenyan and Ethiopian assistance and allies significant strokes against the al-Shabaab. The international community has clearly shown will and initiative to solve the conflicts in Somalia but a nearby solution is not likely.

Problems that should be addressed in the resolution

Somalia is called a failed state since years. Actually the situation is worse: a working state system has never been installed from independence until today. A working state can not be expected in short term but still the question is how it could become possible and which circumstances have to be changed. A resolution of the UNSC could mentions several points. It could address the neighboring countries and their roles. But it also should take into concern how the trust of the population can be regained. But there is more: how can piracy at the horn of Africa be checked and overcome in future? How can the range of attacks be pushed back? What system of jurisdiction should be used and by what law should pirates be trialled? How can the international community interfere effectively when a drought occurs and how can the lives of civilians be protected? How can the area of Mogadishu be stabilized and al-Shabaab be pushed back? Should al-Shabaab be defeated or are negotiations a more preferable way to achieve peace? How can war be ended and the parties be brought to a roundtable? How can the African Union be strengthened which is also affected as an international organization? What strategy should the African Union have? As said before there have been conflicts on the border of the neighboring countries and Kenyan and Ethiopian interventions. This problem should also be addressed.

Further links for your research which might be helpful:

- http://au.int/
- http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Africa/1008piracysomalia.pdf
- http://www.criticalthreats.org/
- http://www.issafrica.org/
- http://amisom-au.org/

Sources

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- Ben Wes 2012: The Expensive, Deminishing Threat of Somali Piracy), Stratfor: online-article as last found on 11/9/2012
- Robyn Hunter 2008: Somali pirates living the high life, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7650415.stm
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- Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (2005): The Somali Republic. General Information; internet source as on the 11/5/2012: http://www.fao.org/fi/oldsite/FCP/en/SOM/profile.htm
- United Nations Childrens' Fund 2011: Somalia: UNICEF and Partners Race to Prevent Second Wave of Death in the Horn of Africa; Internet Article as last found 11/5/2012 on http://allafrica.com/stories/201110290028.html
- UN. Somalia - UNOSOM I. Background.
- http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom1backgr2.html
- UN. Somalia - UNOSOM II, http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosom2p.htm
- UN Economic and Social Council 2005: Advisory Services and Technical Cooperation in the Field of Human Rights. Report of the independent expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia; E/CN.4/2005/117

Topic B

Non-Proliferation

Statement of the Problem

From time immemorial, weapons were used in various forms whenever the peace and security of individuals, nations or states was challenged. For the sake of reining in their devastating and lethal power, numerous international treaties, conventions and regimes that came into existence under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) revolve around the essential task of non-proliferation. At the 62nd annual United Nations Department of Public Information conference, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, being an unwavering advocate for disarmament, pointed out that "[t]he world is over-armed and peace is under-funded." The Secretary-General further explains that

"[I]n 2011, global military spending reportedly exceeded $1.7 trillion, more than $4.6 billion a day, which alone is almost twice the UN's budget for an entire year. This largesse includes billions more for modernizing nuclear arsenals decades into the future. This level of military spending is hard to explain in a post-Cold War world and amidst a global financial crisis. Economists would call this an 'opportunity cost'. I call it human opportunities lost. Nuclear weapons budgets are especially ripe for deep cuts. Such weapons are useless against today's threats to international peace and security".[18]

Weapons unfold their deadly power in many forms but a main distinction can be drawn between conventional and unconventional weapons. The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs refers to unconventional weapons as weapons of mass destruction and lists nuclear, biological and chemical weapons

(NBC weapons) as well as missiles (as a means of their delivery) among this category.

In this regard, UN Security Council Resolution 1540 from April 2004 can be seen as a milestone in addressing the issue of non-proliferation. In resolution 1540 (2004), the Security Council decided that all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, and requires all States to adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws to this effect. The resolution also requires all States to establish various types of domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of such weapons.

The 1540 Committee[19] was established pursuant to resolution 1540 in order to oversee its implementation. In April 2006, the Security Council, by its resolution 1673 (2006), extended the mandate of the 1540 Committee for two years. Resolution 1810 (2008) adopted by the Security Council in April 2008 further extended the mandate of the Committee until 25 April 2011 and tasked it to intensify its efforts to promote the full implementation by all States of resolution 1540 (2004)[20].

In April 2011, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1977, which reaffirms that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and extends the mandate of the 1540

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[18] http://www.un.org/disarmament/

[19] http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/

[20] http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/1540/)

Committee for a period of ten years to 2021. The Security Council thus recognizes that full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) by all States is a long-term task that will require continuous efforts at national, regional and international levels. Resolution 1977 (2011) also provides for two Comprehensive Reviews, one after five years and one before the end of the mandate. Additionally, the 1540 Committee is mandated by resolution 1977 (2011) to continue to strengthen its role to facilitate the provision of technical assistance and to enhance cooperation with relevant international organizations. The Committee is also mandated to continue to refine its outreach efforts, and to continue to institute transparency measures[21].

Nuclear weapons stockpiles						
COUNTRY	Strategic nuclear forces		Non-strategic nuclear forces	Operational warheads	Non-deployed warheads	Total nuclear warheads
	Delivery systems	Warheads				
USA	891	3,575	500	4,075	1,260	5,400
USA nukes in NATO countries	0	0	150-240	150-240		150-240
Russia	685	3,133	2,079	5,192	8,800	14,000
France	166	348	0	348	n/a	348
UK	64	160	0	160	n/a	160
China	141	176	n/a	176	n/a	240
India	200	50-60	0	n/a	0	50-60
Israel	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	100-200
North Korea	150-200 No-Dong, 10 Taepodong	10	n/a	n/a	n/a	10
Pakistan	30-80	n/a	n/a	n/a	0	24-48

Strategic Trends 2010 (Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich)
Source: The Nuclear Threat Initiative

Non-profit organizations like the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)[22] closely monitor the implementation of Resolution 1540. While some regions and countries, like Western Europe, play an active part in promoting the implementation of resolution 1540 and provide assistance in this respect to a variety of countries[23], the implementation, according to the NTI, in Sub-Saharan Africa has been slow[24].

Nuclear Weapons

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) of 1968 is broadly considered as the foundation and cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. It obliges the five nuclear weapon states (NWS) which are parties to the Treaty (USA, Russian Federation, China, France and the United Kingdom) to strive for complete nuclear disarmament while non-nuclear weapon states refrain from developing nuclear weapons. 190 states are parties to the NPT, while three NWS (India, Pakistan and Israel) are not. North Korea, also in possession of nuclear weapons, declared its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003 and carried out nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009. The universalization of the treaty and the appeal to India, Pakistan and Israel to accede to the treaty can be seen as main challenges. Another issues of utmost urgency and importance is the continued dispute about Iran's violations of its obligations under the Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which the IAEA discovered in 2004.

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[21] http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/

[22] http://www.nti.org

[23] http://www.nti.org/analysis/reports/western-europe-1540-reporting/

[24] http://www.nti.org/analysis/reports/sub-saharan-africa-1540-reporting/

The cases of North Korea and Iran demonstrate how essential it is that the non-proliferation regime and its three pillars - nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful use - be further strengthened.

One of the reasons the world has not been able to rein in the proliferation of nuclear weapons more effectively, is that the five NWS have not shown sufficient credibility on the issue of nuclear disarmament (first pillar of the NPT). As the NWS have not taken their disarmament obligations under the NPT seriously enough, other states find efforts to implement non-proliferation policies shallow and unpersuasive, and have not been fully cooperative in addressing proliferation challenges such as those presented by Iran and North Korea[25].

Meanwhile, US President Barack Obama's 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) states that "[b]y demonstrating that we take seriously our NPT obligation to pursue nuclear disarmament, we strengthen our ability to mobilize broad international support for the measures needed to reinforce the nonproliferation regime and secure nuclear materials worldwide".[26] The NPR reiterates the points Obama made one year earlier during his famous 2009 non-proliferation speech in Prague, Czech Republic[27].

While we see that most almost all states ratified the NPT, we may not forget that some states, like the USA, were criticized for only rhetorically supporting the treaty while decisive action is missing. The key to the universalization of the NPT cannot only be the reiteration of North Korea's or Iran's shortcomings or the absence of NWS India, Pakistan and Israel (although these issues seem to be the single most urgent tasks).

Military spending & arms control

Major sources of concern for the maintenance of world peace and security are also the lack of transparency in military spending, the lack of transparency on arms transfers and weak domestic legislation in regard to arms exports[28]. The confluence of these deficiencies might result in destabilizing effects such as regional arms races (e.g. accelerated acquisition of naval capabilities in East Asia since 1990s) and fueling of intrastate conflicts (e.g. Syria, states in Sub-Saharan Africa). Reuters reported on September 20th, 2012 that Syria is receiving Iranian arms transported by civilian aircraft across Iraqi airspace almost daily[29]. Sergei Lavrov, Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, expressed that Moscow is supplying arms to Syria under Soviet-era commitments and contends that "the Russian-Syrian technical military cooperation, [...] aims to support Syria's defense capabilities in the face of external political threat, and not to back [Syrian leader] Bashar al-Assad".[30]
Unfortunately, weapons do not only occupy a threatening role in major crisis regions. The People's Republic (PR) of China and Japan, the world's second and third largest economies, are engaged in a vicious arms race in East Asia since the 1990s: both countries seek to enhance their naval capabilities and struggle over offshore islands, maritime jurisdiction and

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[25] Christopher Ford (2009) "Nuclear Disarmament, Nonproliferation and the Credibility Thesis", Washington, DC: The Hudson Institute

[26] US Department of Defense (2010) "Nuclear Posture Review Report", Washington, DC: US Department of Defense

[27] Daryl G. Kymball at armscontrolnow 2012

[28] http://www.un.org/disarmament/

[29] Louis Charbonneau 2012 at reuters 2012

[30] Shaimaa Fayed on reuters 2012

hydrocarbon resources in the East China Sea. The Japanese Defense White Papers have continuously criticized the lack of transparency revolving around Chinese arms spending. The Washington Post also reports that "China's arms exports have surged over the past decade, flooding sub-Saharan Africa with a new source of cheap assault rifles and ammunition and exposing Beijing to international scrutiny as its lethal wares wind up in conflict zones in violation of UN sanctions".[31]

China's military expenditure 1989 – 2010
Constant US$ m (figures are based on estimates)

Source: SIPRI 2011
Strategic Trends 2012 (Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich)

From the Chinese viewpoint, the United States' pivot to Asia based on its hub and spokes alliance system (with Japan being the most important alliance partner) is seen as means of containing Chinese interests and influence in East Asia. In January 2010 The Obama administration has approved an arms sales package to Taiwan worth more than $6 billion, a move that has enraged China (Helene Cooper at New York Times 2010). And on a larger scale, says Daniel Horner of the Arms Control Association, the USA dominated global arms trade in 2011 by a wide margin[32].

We can clearly see that weapons cause strategic mistrust among interdependent main drivers of the world economy.

## Problems that should be addressed in the resolution

There are different kinds of weapons (conventional as well as unconventional NBC weapons) and weapons occupy devastating roles in war zones but also threatening roles in regions were peace still prevails. A single Security Council Resolution may not answer all questions related to the issue of non-proliferation, however, an IsarMUN Security Council Resolution certainly has to answer, how the implementation process of Resolution 1540 can succeed. More specifically, how can threats emanating from nuclear, biological, chemical and conventional weapons be countered? What role do non-State actors play? Other questions should also be considered: How can the NPT be further strengthened? Is a dual-track approach consisting of civil and military instruments appropriate, which approach is to be prioritized? What kind of threat can failed/failing states and terrorists pose in regard to disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation efforts? How can the Security Council's permanent members which constitute the NWS overcome the lack of credibility when it comes to nuclear disarmament? And if the UNSC wants to focus certain current topics, the following details may be important to consider: How can the Security Council convince North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapon program? How can the Security Council appropriately react on the lack of transparency concerning Iran's nuclear ambitions? Are economic sanctions and a robust military posture viable means?

We call upon the Security Council Member States to single out the most urgent issues for the maintenance of international peace and security through debate and to address them comprehensively.

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[31] Colum Lynch at washingtonpost 2012

[32] Daniel Coner at armscontrol 2012

The nuclear and the non-nuclear world

NPT Nuclear Weapons States ◼
NATO states sharing US nuclear weapons ☐
Non-NPT states with nuclear weapons ◼
Nuclear-weapon-free zones ◼

Strategic Trends 2010 (Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich)
Source: Nuclear Threat Initiative

Links that might be helpful

- http://www.iaea.org/
- http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets
- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons

Sources

- http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/05/us-syria-crisis-russia-arms-idUSBRE8A40BE20121105)
- http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/09/19/uk-syria-crisis-iran-iraq-idUKBRE88I17E20120919
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- http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/30/world/asia/30arms.html
- http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2012_10/US-Dominated-Global-Arms-Trade-in-2011
- http://armscontrolnow.org/2011/04/04/obamas-prague-agenda-two-years-on/